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International business transactions pose the problem of deterring bribing of public officials by
foreign firms. We first analyse a convention styled after the OECD’s ‘Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions’, which
requires signatory countries to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of any
foreign country. We then study the case in which the convention requires signatory countries
to proceed against firms that have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We argue
that the second type of convention is more likely to ensure the enforcement of penalties.
INTRODUCTION
The participation of foreign firms in the market place is commonly believed to
promote competition and efficiency. But international business transactions
pose the problem of effectively deterring the bribing of public officials by
foreign firms. Many corrupt transactions involve companies that are
incorporated in different countries and seek to take advantage of the
disparities among national legal systems, and of the limited ability to enforce
national judicial rulings on foreign nationals and companies. Most countries
do not prosecute domestic firms or their executives when they are found to
have bribed foreign public officials; some countries even regard bribes paid to
foreign officials as part of necessary business expenses to produce taxable
income, and therefore consider them tax deductible.
In the past few years several international organizations, including the
WTO, the UN, the Council of Europe and the OECD, have recognized the
importance of this reality and have started projects aimed at providing an
effective supranational framework to fight corruption. For example, the
OECD’s ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions’ is an attempt to induce individual
countries to regard the corruption of foreign public officials in the same light
as the corruption of domestic public officials. A country that signs the
Convention commits to prosecuting domestic firms found to have bribed
foreign public officials as if they had bribed a local public official.
The OECD Convention came into force in February 1999. Its enforcement
required the approval of five of the ten countries with the largest shares of
OECD exports, representing at least 60% of the combined total exports of
those ten countries. By September 2001, 28 OECD member countries and five
non-member countries had approved the Convention. Under OECD auspices,
a process of multilateral surveillance began in April 1999, with the purpose of
monitoring compliance with the Convention and assessing the steps taken by
countries to implement it in national law.1
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After initial euphoria caused by the OECD Convention’s generalized
approval and public praise, mounting evidence of a lack of enforcement has
generated a more dismal view in the financial and business press:
When OECD member countries signed a convention in 1997 outlawing bribery by
multinational companies of officials abroad, it was regarded as a milestone in the
global fight against corruption. But five years later the convention is in crisis. It has
produced no prosecutions . . . In a Transparency International Survey of senior
managers in emerging market economies, conducted by Gallup International
between December 2001 and March 2002, only one in five respondents knew
something about the convention.2
[T]he London based Control Risk Group . . . found that only 56 per cent of British
companies, 38 per cent of German and 30 of Dutch companies were familiar with the
convention. Moreover, new laws have not resulted in any convictions.3
This paper is an attempt to provide an initial analysis of corruption in
international business transactions by studying the extent to which different
international arrangements are likely to ensure the enforcement of anti-
corruption legislations beyond national borders. In particular, we ask how
likely the OECD Convention is to succeed in its goal, and whether a different
institutional arrangement may lead to superior results.
We consider a multi-country model of procurement. Each country procures
one unit of a good and the procurement process is managed by a public official.
Firms active in a country may attempt to bribe the public official in order to
win the procurement contract. Individual countries simultaneously set the
penalties that are imposed on domestic firms that operate in the same country
and on domestic firms operating abroad. After that, each country sets the
monitoring intensity that determines the probability with which a corrupt
transaction will be discovered. When a corrupt transaction is discovered, a
penalty is imposed on the bribing firm. When the firm discovered to have
bribed the public official is a local firm, the government has the ability to
enforce the penalty. But if the firm is foreign, the penalty is not enforced unless
the firm’s home country ‘cooperates’ with the judicial system of the country in
which the illegal transaction took place. After countries have publicly set
penalties and monitoring technologies, firms offer bribes in a probabilistic
auction. As a result, the contract available in any one country is awarded to a
firm operating in that country with a probability that depends on the bribe that
firm offered. In this situation we find, unsurprisingly, that, because enforcing
penalties is costly, it is a dominant strategy for each individual country not to
impose any penalties on domestic firms bribing foreign public officials.
We then examine whether international cooperation is more likely to arise
when a convention similar to the OECD Convention is proposed and when
individual countries have to decide simultaneously whether or not to adhere to
the Convention before setting penalties and monitoring probabilities. We make
use of a simple model in which countries that sign the Convention have the
ability of committing to enforce it. The discussion of the recent evidence on
the OECD Convention clarifies that a country that signs a convention may in
the end choose not to enforce it. This in turn implies that the meaningful
decision is not whether or not to sign the Convention, but rather whether or
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not to enforce it. Our paper is concerned with the second decision, but for ease
of exposition we make reference to a situation in which countries decide to sign
the convention but have the ability to commit to enforcing it.
We find that a convention styled after the OECD Convention may generate
some degree of international cooperation and that multiple and Pareto-ranked
equilibria exist. Our analysis centres in particular on the impact of the clause
requiring a minimum number of signatory countries for the Convention to
enter into force. We show that this minimum threshold may be beneficial,
because it can rule out high corruption equilibria, but may also be detrimental,
because if it is set too high it may leave only one equilibrium in which no
country signs the convention.
We finally consider an alternative convention that stipulates that signatory
countries must commit to enforcing penalties on domestic firms that are found
to have bribed public officials of signatory countries only. We find that this
kind of convention accomplishes two objectives. First, it provides additional
incentives to sign the convention, because the benefits of the convention are
enjoyed only by those countries that sign it. Second, it reduces the enforcement
costs that derive from signing the convention when few countries sign it. This
reduces the incentives not to sign the convention when few countries are
expected to sign, and therefore makes the emergence of equilibria with a
reduced number of signatory countries less likely. We argue that these effects
make the reciprocal convention a more appealing institutional framework than
the OECD Convention.
The growing international nature of corruption is an aspect that has largely
been ignored by the economic profession until recently. Davis (2002) analyses
the incentives of payor countries (i.e. countries where bribing companies are
incorporated) to proceed unilaterally against domestic firms found to have
bribed foreign public officials. Because of its focus on corruption in pro-
curement, our paper is related to the existing literature on corruption in
procurement and in particular to the works on the optimal response of
procurement mechanisms to corruption, such as Laffont and Tirole (1991),
Laffont and N’Guessan (1999) and Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
I. THE MODEL
Consider N sovereign countries and N2 firms. Firm (i, j) is incorporated in
country i and operates in country j, i ¼ 1, . . . ,N, j ¼ 1, . . . ,N. This means that
N firms operate in each country, one locally incorporated and N 1 foreign
firms, and that each country has N firms, one that operates in the country and
N 1 operating abroad.4 We choose to consider the case of N countries,
because the case with two countries is a special case in which an important
effect that will be discussed later is absent. The government of each country has
to procure a good that can be produced at different quality levels. For
simplicity, we assume there are only two levels of quality, low and high. When
quality is low, the government’s valuation of the good is V and when it
is high it is V>V . Given that the government of country i makes decisions
on behalf of country i, in the rest of the paper we will use the two terms
interchangeably.
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The good to be procured by each government is purchased from any one of
the N firms that operate in the country. All firms are commonly known to have
the same production costs. We denote by K and K the cost of producing low
and high quality, respectively, with 0)K<K . For the sake of simplicity, in
the rest of the paper we assume that it is profitable for governments to procure
the good at the high quality level in all equilibria. Notice that a necessary
condition for this to happen is that it is efficient to procure high quality, i.e.
V  V>K  K .
Each government delegates the execution of the procurement process to a
public official who is able to verify that the good is of high quality prior to
making the payment to the supplying firm. Firms are risk-neutral and
maximize expected profits. Given that all firms are commonly known to have
the same cost, we assume that the public official randomly selects a firm
operating in the country and awards it a procurement contract that requires
high quality and that promises a payment of K if the high quality good is
supplied.
Any firm can bribe the public official in an effort to win the contract for the
project and to be allowed (illegally) to supply low quality, an event we refer to
as corruption. We assume that a corrupt transaction is the result of the
following probabilistic auction. Each firm in a given country sets a non-
negative bribe. If firm (i, j) (incorporated in country i and operating in country
j) sets bribe bijX 0, it will win the auction (it will succeed in corrupting the
public official of country j) with probability
ð1Þ gij ¼
bij
B
;
where B40 is an exogenous parameter that measures public officials’
propensity to corruption.5 A firm (i, j) is required to pay the bribe it offered,
bij, only if it wins the auction (only if it succeeds in corrupting the public official
of country j), i.e. only with probability bij/B. Under this probabilistic auction, a
firm that bids a higher bribe has a higher probability of corrupting the public
official, but this probability is less than 1. Our way of modelling corruption is
similar to the way in which rent seeking is often modelled, but with two
differences. First, we assume that the bribe bid by each individual firm is a
promise of payment if the firm is awarded the contract, and that no outlay is
required of firms that have not been awarded the contract. This contrasts with
the literature on rent seeking, which assumes that rent seekers’ expenditures are
unconditional, so that also losing rent seekers bear the cost of participating in
the contest. Second, we assume that the probability of corruption is less than 1,
and we are especially interested in determining what causes this probability to
be higher or lower. By contrast, the literature on rent seeking normally assumes
that the rent is assigned with probability 1 and that an individual bidder’s
expenditure has an impact only on its own probability of being awarded the
rent, but not on the overall probability of the rent being assigned.
For the sake of simplicity, in what follows we will assume that all equilibria
are interior, so that in particular
ð2Þ bij*0 for all ði; jÞ
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ð3Þ
XN
i¼1
bij
B
<b<1 for all j:
Notice that (3) implies that in all equilibria there is probability of at least
1 b>0 that no corruption takes place. This is important, because the
assumption that the government requires high quality is justified only if this
probability is positive and sufficiently high.
When firm (i, j) bribes the public official of country j, it is discovered with
probability mjA[0, 1], which is determined by the government of country j. We
assume that if firm (i, j) is found to have bribed the public official of country j,
it receives a non-monetary penalty pij which is determined by the government
of country i, the country in which the firm is incorporated. This assumption
is meant to recognize that each country has very limited ability to enforce
penalties on firms incorporated in foreign countries, unless these foreign
countries cooperate. We assume that only two possible levels for penalties
exist: pij [f0; pg, with pij ¼ p>0 meaning that firm (i, j) is penalized by country
i and pij ¼ 0 meaning that firm (i, j) is not penalized by country i. Our
description should be regarded as a stylized representation of a situation in
which the enforcement of penalties against foreign firms and their executives is
less effective than the enforcement of a penalty against a domestic firm and its
executives. The assumption that without cooperation of the country where
the firm is incorporated the penalty is 0 is without loss of generality. Our
qualitative results would be the same with nonzero penalty but lower effective
deterrence for foreign firms.
We assume that, if a country chooses monitoring probability m, it bears
cost
MCi mð Þ ¼ M
2
m2;
where M40 is an exogenous parameter. We also assume that, if country i
prosecutes firm (i, j) (when the firm is found to have bribed the public official of
country j), it bears a cost equal to P40.
Let
m ¼ðmiÞNi¼1
g ¼ððgijÞNj¼1ÞNi¼1
p ¼ððpijÞNj¼1ÞNi¼1
and let gi ¼ SNj¼1gji denote the probability of corruption in country i.
The government of country i is risk neutral and has preferences represented
by the following utility function:
ð4Þ Gi m; p; gð Þ ¼ 1 gið Þ V  K
 þ gi V  K M2 m2i XN
j¼1
gijmj
pij
p
P:
The first two terms refer to the expected net utility of procuring the good. With
probability 1 gi there is no corruption: in this case the good is of high quality,
it is worth V to the government, and the payment to the supplier is K . With
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probability gi there is corruption: in this case the good is of low quality, it is
worth V to the government, and the payment to the supplier is K . The third
term represents the cost to government i of setting a monitoring probability
equal to mi. The last term represents the cost to the government of country i of
prosecuting domestic firms that operate in the country or abroad. The cost of
prosecuting firm (i, j) (i.e. setting pij ¼ p) is P multiplied by the probability that
firm (i, j) is involved in a corrupt transaction which is uncovered in country j,
gijmj. Notice that we ignore the cost of prosecuting (successfully or un-
successfully) foreign firms that operate in the country, because these costs are
likely to be considerable but are inessential for the purposes of the paper.6
In the following we will find it useful to view the payoffs to the government
of any one country as the benefits of procurement, BPiðgÞ,
BPiðgÞ ¼ ð1 giÞðV  KÞ þ giðV  KÞ;
minus the monitoring cost,MCiðm; p; gÞ, defined above, minus the enforcement
cost, ECiðm; p; gÞ,
ECiðm; p; gÞ ¼
XN
j¼1
gijmj
pij
p
P:
Summarizing, we can express the utility function of the government of country
i as
Giðm; p; gÞ ¼ BPiðm; p; gÞ MCiðm; p; gÞ  ECiðm; p; gÞ:
The preferences of firm (i, j) are represented by the utility function
Fijðbij; mj; pijÞ ¼
bij
B
½ðK  KÞ  bij  mjpij :
In words, if firm (i, j) is not involved in a corrupt transaction, it makes zero
profit. If it is, an event that happens with probability gij ¼ bij/B, it makes an
extra profit equal to ðK  KÞ, it pays out bribe bij to the public official of
country j, and it suffers an expected penalty equal to mjpij.
We summarize the extensive form of the game through the following time
sequence.
 Stage 1 (penalties). The governments of all countries announce contests to
procure high quality goods and publicly set penalties for corruption.
Government i sets ðpijÞNj¼1.
 Stage 2 (monitoring probabilities). The governments of all countries observe
ððpijÞNj¼1ÞNi¼1 and choose monitoring probabilities. Government i sets mi.
 Stage 3 (bribe bidding). Firms (i, j), i ¼ 1, . . . ,N, j ¼ 1, . . . ,N, observe
ðmi; ðpijÞNj¼1ÞNi¼1 and choose bijX 0.
 Stage 4 (outcomes and payoffs). In each country i ¼ 1, . . . ,N the public
official is bribed by firm (i, j) with probability gij ¼ bij/B, j ¼ 1, . . . ,N. In
this case firm (i, j) is awarded the procurement project, produces a low
quality good, is reimbursed for the high quality good, and pays out bribe
bij to the public official. With probability mi the corrupt agreement is
uncovered and penalty pij is imposed on the firm.
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With probability 1 gi the public official of country i is not bribed by any
firm. In this case the public official randomly awards the project to any firm
(i, j), j ¼ 1, . . . ,N. Firm (i, j) produces a high quality good and is
reimbursed its cost.
We denote by G the game defined by the previous extensive form. For the
sake of simplicity, in the following we will focus on parameter constellations
such that SPNE outcomes are all interior, i.e. miA(0, 1), gijA(0, 1), giA(0, 1), for
all i and all j. Notice that this is always the case provided that B is sufficiently
high and that P is not too high,
ð5Þ P<V  V
K  K p:
We now want to justify the way in which we model corruption and in
particular the choice of endogenizing corruption probabilities through the
probabilistic auction described above. First, note that our main goal is to study
how different deterrence mechanisms endow private parties with different
incentives to engage in corrupt transactions. Recall that the probabilistic
auction we propose implies that firms offering higher bribes have a higher
probability of corrupting the public official, but that any firm bidding a
positive bribe has a positive probability of corrupting the public official. Given
that firms with higher expected gains from corruption find it optimal to offer
higher bribes, the probabilistic auction
1. takes into account that firms with higher incentives to engage in corrupt
transactions are more likely to corrupt a public official; and
2. recognizes that any firm with a positive expected gain from corruption has a
positive probability of succeeding in corrupting the public official.
Property 1 seems uncontroversial, in that it conveys the idea that
corruptors’ willingness to pay is important. Property 2 states that the public
official may strike a deal with a firm that is not the one willing to pay the
highest bribe. We believe that property 2 is appealing for the following reason.
Corrupt arrangements are illegal and therefore face significant and varying
transaction costs arising from asymmetric information and the absence of legal
commitments. This may ultimately lead to a corrupt transaction with a firm
different from the one that can generate the highest surplus and is there-
fore willing to pay the highest bribe. For example, existing communication
networks and established reputations may reduce transaction costs with some
selected firms and may make an agreement with these firms more likely,
regardless of their expected gains from corruption.
The probabilistic auction should be regarded as a reduced form that
describes how different incentives to engage in corrupt transactions translate
into corruption probabilities. We believe that resorting to a reduced-form
model is appropriate, because corruption can be organized in a wide variety of
different ways, and any detailed description of the process that leads to a
corrupt agreement is bound to be incomplete and may lead to unreasonable
predictions.7
Before concluding, it is important to emphasize that our probabilistic
auction implies that the probability of any one firm succeeding in bribing the
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public official depends only on the bribe it promises and on B, the propensity
of the public official to become corrupt (see equation (1)). In other words, the
probability of a firm succeeding in bribing the public official is independent of
the bribes that are promised by the other firms.8 This simplifies the analysis,
because firms have dominant strategies in the bribe setting game of stage 3. But
it should be stressed, that the results of the paper would be unchanged in a
more general environment in which the probability of a firm bribing the public
official also depended on the bribes of competing firms. For example, we have
verified that all our results hold when
ð6Þ gij ¼
bij þ l bij  1N
PN
z¼1 bzj
 
B
with lA[0, 1) and gijA[0, 1]; notice that (1) is a special case of (6) in which
l ¼ 0. With this specification, which is reminiscent of models of yardstick
competition, if firm (i, j) chooses a bribe that gives it a positive probability of
succeeding in bribing the public official of country j, this probability is
increasing in its own bribe and increasing in the difference between its own
bribe and the average bribe. This implies that the probability of succeeding in
bribing the public official is decreasing in the bribes bid by competing firms.9
II. THE BASIC GAME: FREE RIDING
This section studies subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of G. We start by
analysing individual firms’ play at stage 3.
Lemma 1. In a SPNE of G
ð7Þ bij ¼
1
2
ðK  KÞ  mjpij
 
; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N; j ¼ 1; . . . ; N:
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 states that each firm (i, j) bids a bribe that is proportional to the
value of the corrupt agreement minus its expected penalty. From Lemma 1, the
probability that the firm (i, j) reaches a corrupt agreement with the public
official of country j is
ð8Þ gij ¼
1
2B
K  K  mjpij 
and the probability of corruption taking place in country j is
ð9Þ gj ¼
1
2B
N K  K  mjXN
i¼1
pij
" #
:
We now turn to the monitoring probabilities set by governments in stage 2.
Let pFi ¼ Sj 6 ipji denote the sum of penalties imposed by foreign governments
on the respective foreign firms operating in country i.
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Lemma 2. In a SPNE of G
ð10Þ mi ¼
V  V  pii þ pFið Þ  piip P K  K 
2 MB pii
p
Ppii
  ; i ¼ 1; . . . ; N:
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2 shows that in stage 2 the monitoring intensity chosen by the
government of country i is increasing in V  V , the value of deterring
corruption, increasing in pFi the sum of the penalties faced by the foreign firms
operating in the country, and decreasing in K  K , the value of a corrupt
agreement to the corrupt parties.
The following proposition characterizes the path of the SPNE of G.
Proposition 1. In the path of the unique SPNE of G, for i ¼ 1, . . . ,N,
pnij ¼
p if j ¼ i
0 if j 6¼ i
(
mni ¼
ðV  VÞp ðK  KÞP
2ðBM  pPÞ
bnij ¼
1
2
½ðK  KÞ  mnj pnij
gnij ¼
1
2B
½ðK  KÞ  mnj p if j ¼ i
1
2B
ðK  KÞ if j 6¼ i
8<:
gnj ¼
1
2B
½NðK  KÞ  mnj p
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that in a SPNE of G the government of each country i
sets a positive penalty on firm (i, i), the domestically incorporated firm that
operates in the country, pnii ¼ p>0. The government of country i finds this
optimal because a positive penalty on firm (i, i) decreases the probability that
the firm bribes the public official and therefore decreases the total probability
that the local public official is involved in a corrupt transaction. On the other
hand, given that imposing a penalty on firm (i, j), j 6¼ i, is costly to the
government of country i but beneficial only for country j, no government
imposes penalties on domestically incorporated firms that operate abroad, i.e.
for all i ¼ 1, . . . ,N, pij ¼ 0, 8j 6¼ i. Given that a positive penalty on firm (i, i)
makes monitoring valuable, in a SPNE the government of each country i sets a
positive monitoring probability such that the marginal value of deterring
corruption of firm (i, i) is equal to the marginal cost of monitoring.
From Proposition 1, the probability that a public official is bribed by an
arbitrary foreign firm is higher than the probability that he is bribed by the
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domestic firm, gij4gii, because foreign firms face lower expected penalties and
therefore find it optimal to offer higher bribes. This implies that, in the stylized
setting described in this paper, an easy if partial remedy against corruption
would be to require that the procurement contract always be awarded to the
domestic firm. This result is an artificial consequence of some simplifying
assumptions we make, in particular the following.
1. Firms do not have private information about their costs or other possibly
relevant parameters, such as their quality. This implies that competition
plays no role in achieving efficiency or in reducing the expected procurement
cost.
2. A bribe of a given amount is equally likely to succeed in bribing the public
official regardless of whether it is offered by a domestic firm or a foreign
firm. This implies that we do not recognize that local firms are normally
more effective in establishing connections with public officials, and we
therefore underestimate the probability that they are involved in a corrupt
transaction.10
In other words, we share the common views that the participation of
foreign firms promotes competition and leads to efficiency gains and that,
ceteris paribus, domestic firms are more likely to succeed in bribing the public
official. For these reasons, we believe that it is desirable to allow foreign
bidders to participate in competitive procurement mechanisms. But to keep the
analysis tractable, rather than proposing a model in which it is optimal to allow
foreign firms to participate, we simply assume that they are allowed, even if
they are subject to a less effective penalty scheme.11 The focus of our paper is
on how to rein in foreign firms’ propensities to bribe public officials.
III. THE IMPACT OF CONVENTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY
The previous section serves to make the point that it is costly for the
government of country i to impose penalties on its firms that are operating
abroad and that the beneficial effects deriving from corruption deterrence are
enjoyed only by foreign countries. As a consequence, no such penalties are
imposed in equilibrium.
This section studies international conventions designed to deter interna-
tional corruption by requiring countries to impose penalties on domestic firms
operating abroad. Before turning to this analysis, we first wish to consider the
consequences of setting penalties on firms operating abroad.
Corollary 1. Consider a subgame of G starting at stage 2. In a SPNE of this
subgame.
@mi
@pFi
>0
@gi
@pFi
<0
@Gi
@pFi
>0:
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Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 1 states that, when pFi, the sum of the penalties faced by foreign
firms in country i, is higher, the government of country i finds it optimal to
increase the monitoring intensity, because the larger penalties increase
marginal deterrence and therefore make monitoring more valuable at the
margin. Corollary 1 also states that an increase in pFi leads to a reduction in
corruption in country i. This deterrence arises for two reasons. First, increasing
penalties has a direct effect because it makes bribing more costly in expected
terms. Second, larger penalties lead to higher monitoring intensities, and this
reinforces the increase in the expected penalty. Finally, Corollary 1 states that,
if the government of a country j imposes penalties on its firm operating in
country i 6¼ j, it creates positive externalities on country i.
We now introduce a class of conventions inspired by the OECD
‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions’.
Definition 1: Convention U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N. If a country signs the Convention
and the Convention enters into force, the country is committed to imposing the
same penalty on all domestically incorporated firms found to have bribed a
public official, regardless of the country where the public official is based. The
Convention enters into force only if the number of signatory countries is
greater than or equal to the threshold t.
Note that we denote this type of convention by U(t) to stress the fact that
the convention is unilateral in the sense that a signatory country commits to
prosecuting any of its firms found to be bribing public officials of any foreign
country, regardless of whether or not these countries reciprocate. As in the
OECD Convention, under this kind of convention countries are allowed to
choose their monitoring efforts, but they are required to enforce uniform
penalties on domestic firms that have been found to have bribed public officials
of any country. In other words, signatory countries commit to equating
penalties for bribing domestic and foreign public officials. Focusing on this
type of convention implicitly recognizes that it may be very difficult to verify
monitoring efforts, but that it is easier to verify whether or not countries are
enforcing penalties on domestic firms that have been found to have bribed
foreign public officials.
We will focus on the game in which individual countries, before setting
penalties and monitoring probabilities, decide whether or not to sign a given
convention C ¼ U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N, that constrains their subsequent choices.
Definition 2. Let G(C) be the game in which the governments of individual
countries simultaneously decide at stage 0 whether or not to sign Convention C
and then play as in G, with the possible restrictions that having signed
Convention C may entail. Preferences for all players are inherited from G.
Notice that in G(C) Convention C is given. This means that countries
cannot propose or agree on a convention different from C, but can only decide
at stage 0 whether or not to sign Convention C. We focus on this game because
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we are interested in analysing individual countries’ reactions to given con-
ventions, rather than in predicting what conventions are likely to be proposed.
In other words, the prime objective of this paper is a normative rather than a
positive analysis.
To analyse the SPNE of G(C), we proceed backwards and start from firms’
bidding strategies in stage 3. Note that in a SPNE of G(C) the bribe offered by
any one firm depends on whether or not a convention is in force, only because
the convention may have an impact on the penalties and the monitoring
probabilities set by governments in stages 1 and 2. In other words, firms’ SPNE
bidding strategies in stage 3 of G(C) are identical to the SPNE bidding
strategies in G and are therefore characterized by Lemma 1.
A similar argument applies to monitoring probabilities set by individual
countries in stage 2 of G(C), and SPNE monitoring probabilities are therefore
still characterized by Lemma 2. Notice in particular that, because by Lemma 2
a country’s monitoring probability depends only on the sum of the penalties on
the firms active in the country, when a convention is in force all signatory
countries will choose the same monitoring probability and all non-signatory
countries will choose a higher one. To see this, notice that, if n countries sign
Convention U(t) and the Convention enters into force (i.e. if nX t), a non-
signatory country faces n signatory countries, but a signatory country only
n 1. It is important to remark that, while non-signatory countries have higher
monitoring probabilities, the monitoring probability of a given country does
not depend on whether or not the country signs the Convention. In other
words, if a non-signatory country decides to deviate and sign the Convention,
its monitoring probability is unaffected whereas the monitoring probabilities of
all other countries increase.
Under Convention U(t), stage 1 SPNE strategies are very easily character-
ized. When at least t countries sign the convention in stage 0, in stage 1
signatory countries set positive penalties for all their firms, regardless of
whether they are operating in the home country or abroad, and each non-
signatory country sets a positive penalty only for the domestic firm that
operates in the country. When less than t countries sign the convention at stage
0, each country sets a positive penalty only for the domestic firm that is
operating in the country.
In the next proposition we make use of the previous results and move to the
characterization of SPNE strategies in stage 0. Rather than presenting the
results for Conventions U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N, we focus our attention on
Convention U(N) in particular, because it has a special interest for our
analysis. For the sake of completeness, we will briefly summarize the results for
Conventions U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N 1 at the end of the present section.
Proposition 2. In G(U(N)) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign
the Convention.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 clarifies that when t ¼ N each country becomes pivotal to the
convention entering into force. This implies that, when considering a possible
deviation from a profile in which all N countries sign Convention U(N), each
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country compares the situation in which all countries penalize their firms
abroad with that in which none does. Given the symmetry in the model, the
assumption that guarantees that each country sets a positive penalty for the
domestic firm operating in the country also ensures that the benefit to be
derived from a convention undersigned by all N countries is at least as large as
the enforcement cost that each country has to bear for signing it. Therefore, a
unilateral deviation from the profile in which all N countries sign the
convention is not profitable.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that a unilateral convention that enters
into force only if all N countries sign it will lead to all countries signing the
convention, and therefore to the convention entering into force. In this sense
Proposition 2 suggests that there is an easy solution to the problem of
international corruption. In the rest of this section we argue that this
interpretation is overly optimistic because the result of Proposition 2 is not
robust.
Proposition 2 may be regarded as making two separate statements.
1. Convention U(N) makes each country pivotal and therefore endows
individual countries with incentives to sign.
2. Because all countries have incentives to sign the convention, the convention
enters into force.
Suppose that the payoffs of individual countries are not exactly as specified
in the model, but that each individual country may have an idiosyncratic
disposition to sign the convention. A country inclined to sign derives an excess
payoff from signing that is larger than the excess benefits of procurement,
minus the excess monitoring cost, minus the excess enforcement cost. A
country inclined not to sign derives an excess payoff from signing that is lower
than the excess benefits of procurement, minus the excess monitoring cost,
minus the excess enforcement cost.
Introducing these idiosyncratic effects seems reasonable, for several
reasons. First, our simple model does not take into account asymmetries that
may endow different countries with different incentives to sign. Second, the
model does not acknowledge the fact that the governments of some countries
are involved in corrupt transactions and therefore are likely to want to see the
failure of any attempt to curb international corruption. Finally, the model
ignores the fact that governments that commit to penalizing the bribery of
foreign public officials may receive a benefit for a variety of reasons, ranging
from pure altruism to gains deriving from signalling its resolve to fight
corruption, and from an improved international status to more generous access
to loans from the World Bank or the IMF.
When these idiosyncratic effects are recognized, Convention U(N) still
maximizes the incentives of individual countries to sign, but it provides no
guarantee that all countries will end up signing, and therefore that the
convention will enter into force. In other words, we are persuaded by
Proposition 2’s contention that making each country pivotal creates some
incentives to sign; but we believe that its prediction that all countries will sign is
not robust. For this reason, the remainder of this paper is dedicated to an
analysis of the impact of conventions on international corruption when
individual countries have idiosyncratic propensities to sign a convention.
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Before turning to an explicit analysis of the consequences of idiosyncratic
payoff functions, we want to give a brief discussion of the extension of the
result of Proposition 2 to Conventions U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N 1. In a SPNE
under Convention U(t), t ¼ 1, . . . ,N 1, no more than t countries will sign
the convention. In particular, if t is high enough in all SPNE of G(U(t)) exactly
t countries will sign the convention. This is the case because each of the t
signatory countries is pivotal to the convention entering into force, and because
with a high t a signatory country’s benefits of procurement deriving from the
fact that t 1 foreign countries penalize their firms operating abroad are
sufficient to compensate the increase in the enforcement costs that the
signatory country bears for signing the convention. When t is low, in all SPNE
of G(U(t)) exactly t 1 countries sign the convention. This is because each of
the N tþ 1 non-signatory countries is pivotal to the convention not entering
into force, and finds it optimal not to deviate and sign because with a low t the
benefits of procurement deriving from the fact that t 1 foreign countries
penalize their firms operating abroad are not sufficient to compensate the
increase in the enforcement costs that signing the convention and causing it
enter into force would entail.
The previous discussion illustrates that in a simple game such as G(U(t))
there are obvious gains from making t as high as possible. This is the reason we
chose to focus our analysis on U(N). The goal of the rest of the paper is to show
that the introduction of idiosyncratic components in the inclination to sign a
convention leads to dramatic changes.
IV. UNILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND IDIOSYNCRATIC PREFERENCES
In this section we allow the preferences of countries to differ from Gi m;p; gð Þ.
Let siA{Y, N} denote the action of signing (si ¼ Y) or not (si ¼ N) the
convention for country i at stage 0.
Definition 3. Let G(a, C) be the game in which Nature publicly draws a ¼
ða1; . . . ; aNÞ[RN at stage  1. The governments of individual countries
simultaneously decide at stage 0 whether or not to sign Convention C and then
play as in G, with the possible restrictions that having signed Convention C
may entail. Preferences for firms are inherited from G. Governments’
preferences are represented by
eGi s; m; p; gð Þ ¼ Gi m; p; gð Þ if si ¼ NGi m; p; gð Þ þ ai if si ¼ Y

Notice that, as in G(C), in G(a, C) Convention C is given. This means that
countries cannot propose different conventions but can only decide whether to
sign Convention C at stage 0 of the game. In game G(a, C), the act of signing
the convention gives each individual government i an additive and idiosyn-
cratic extra utility of ai [R that does not depend on whether or not other
countries have signed the Convention and in particular on whether or not the
Convention enters into force. Notice that ai can be positive, negative or zero.
Without loss of generality, we index countries so that a1*a2*   *aN
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We now want to discuss some preliminary results that will be useful for the
characterization of the SPNE of G(a, C). In particular, we are interested in
analysing the impact of the decision to sign a convention on the enforcement
costs borne by a signatory country. To do this we need to analyse the changes
in the continuation play and continuation utilities that may derive from an
individual country’s deviation from a given stage 0 action profile.
Consider a subgame starting at stage 1 after a total of nX t countries have
signed Convention U(t) at stage 0. In a SPNE of this subgame signatory
countries set penalties for all their firms and non-signatory countries set
penalties only for their firms operating domestically. Consider now stage 2 and
denote by mSn and mNSn the SPNE monitoring probabilities in a signatory and
non-signatory country, respectively. Similarly, let g i
Sn and g i
NSn denote the
SPNE probabilities that a firm incorporated in country i is involved in a corrupt
transaction in a foreign signatory or non-signatory country, respectively.
The following lemma characterizes the reduction in enforcement costs that
a signatory country i could achieve by deviating and not signing the
convention.
Lemma 3. Consider G(a,U(t)) and an action profile at stage 0 in which nX t
countries (including country i) sign Convention U(t). The reduction in
enforcement costs that country i could achieve by deviating and not signing
the convention is
DECiðnÞ ¼ ½ðn 1ÞgSnimSn þ ðN  nÞgNSni mNSnP:
Proof. This is immediate. &
The enforcement costs deriving from signing Convention U(t) depend on
the number of signatory countries, n, because signing the Convention implies
an enforcement cost for country i that depends on the expected number of
corruption cases that are uncovered. Given that this expected number is equal
to the probability of corruption times the monitoring probability, it depends on
the number of signatory countries, as the latter affects both probabilities of
corruption and monitoring probabilities. DECiðnÞ in Lemma 3 describes the
magnitude of enforcement cost savings that government i would attain by
deviating from a profile in which it signs Convention U(t) together with n 1
other countries. Notice that the enforcement cost savings depend on the
number of the other countries that penalize the bribing of foreign public offi-
cials; however, they depend on the specific convention only to the extent
that they are different from 0 so long as nX t but are otherwise independent
of t.
Consider now a profile with n4t signatory countries. For that to be part of
a SPNE of G(a,U(t)), it is necessary and sufficient that neither signatory nor
non-signatory countries prefer to deviate. If a signatory country deviates, it
loses ai and it saves on enforcement costs, but its benefits of procurement and
monitoring costs in the continuation game are unaffected. For a signatory
country not to want to deviate, we therefore need ai>DECiðnÞ. If a non-
signatory country deviates, it receives aj and has increased enforcement costs,
but its benefits of procurement and monitoring costs in the continuation game
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are unaffected. For a non-signatory country not to prefer a deviation, we
therefore need ai>DECiðnþ 1Þ.
The previous discussion clarifies that DECiðnÞ has a prominent impact on
the SPNE of G(a,U(t)) and its properties. We therefore turn to its
characterization. To simplify the presentation, in the following we will
consider the extension of DECiðnÞ to Rþ. The following Lemma characterizes
an important property of DECiðnÞ.
Lemma 4. DECiðnÞ is a concave quadratic function of n, if NX 3.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 4 lies at the heart of our main results and therefore deserves careful
consideration. Note that this lemma implies that DECiðnÞ may have an
increasing portion. This means that it is possible that adding one signatory
country to the convention may imply a negative externality on the current
signatory countries, in the sense that it causes enforcement costs of signatory
countries to increase. This may seem surprising, because it means that the
participation of an additional country in a convention may generate a negative
externality. To see why this negative externality may occur, consider the case
in which there are three countries. Suppose that country 1 plans to sign
Convention U(1), and consider its enforcement costs when it is the only
signatory and when country 2 signs as well. From Corollary 1 we know that the
effect of country 2 prosecuting its firms in country 1 is beneficial to the
government of country 1.
Consider now the consequences on country 1 of country 2 prosecuting its
firm that is active in country 3, firm (2, 3). By Corollary 1, country 3 finds it
optimal to respond by augmenting the probability with which any local corrupt
transaction is discovered. But the increase in the monitoring probability in
country 3 has two different repercussions on the probability that firm (1, 3) is
found to have bribed a public official of country 3: first, it creates additional
deterrence; second, it increases the probability with which a corrupt
transaction is discovered. The first effect tends to decrease the probability
that firm (1, 3) is found to have bribed the public official of country 3, because
it decreases the probability that bribing occurs. The second effect tends to
increase the probability that firm (1, 3) is found to have bribed the public
official of country 3, because it increases the probability with which bribing is
discovered if it occurs.
Given that the two effects have different signs, the net effect on the
probability that firm (1, 3) is found to have bribed a public official of country 3
may be to decrease or increase it. Because the enforcement costs are increasing
in this probability, country 1’s enforcement costs may increase or decrease
when country 2 signs the convention. Note that the effect discussed above
arises only if there are at least three countries, and this is the reason why we
chose to consider a case with N countries rather than a simpler model with only
two countries.
We now want to investigate the case when the gains from deviating and not
signing a convention that derive from the savings in enforcement costs are
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maximal. We define
v ¼ argmax
n[ ð1; ...;NÞ
DECiðnÞ:
Notice that v is not necessarily a singleton, because DECiðnÞ is a concave
quadratic function in n and therefore there may be two values of nA{1, . . . ,N}
that attain the maximum. Consider now a profile in which n countries sign
Convention U(1) at stage 0. If a signatory country deviates from such a profile,
its enforcement cost savings are maximal when nAv. Given that v characterizes
the action profiles at stage 0 from which an individual deviation generates the
largest enforcement cost savings, it will prove useful to discuss the incentives
individual governments have to deviate from a given action profile at stage 0.
Equilibria with Convention Uð1Þ
Under Convention U(1), a signatory country commits to penalizing its firms
found to have bribed the public officials of all foreign countries and regardless
of the number of other countries signing the convention. Convention U(1)
differs from the OECD Convention but it constitutes a useful benchmark and a
useful reference to discuss Conventions U(t), t41, which will be analysed in
the next subsection. The following proposition characterizes SPNE under
Convention U(1).
Proposition 3. Consider G(a, U(1)).
1. A SPNE of G(a, U(1)) always exists.
2. There may be at most one SPNE with min v or fewer signatory countries.
3. There may be multiple SPNE with min vþ 1 or more signatory countries.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 says that, in the case in which an individual country’s
enforcement cost savings DECiðnÞ monotonically increase with n (i.e. when
min v ¼ N), a unique SPNE exists. To see this, suppose that two SPNE exist,
the first with N0 and the second with N004N0 signatory countries. Because of
the symmetry of the model, in the first SPNE the N0 countries with the highest
a sign the convention, and all the other countries do not. By the same
argument, in the second SPNE the N00 countries with the highest a sign the
convention, and all the other countries do not. This means that countries
i ¼ N0 þ 1, . . . ,N00 sign the convention in the first SPNE but not in the second.
Noting that the the enforcement cost savings are larger in the second SPNE
than in the first leads to a contradiction.
When a signatory country’s reduction in enforcement costs deriving from
deviating and not signing, DECiðnÞ, monotonically decrease with n (i.e. when
min v ¼ 1), the previous argument cannot be applied. Instead, when DECiðnÞ
monotonically decreases with n, instead, the fact that an additional country
signs Convention U(1) reduces the excess enforcement costs that any country
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has to bear for signing the convention. This generates a strategic comple-
mentarity and leads to the emergence of multiple SPNE.
When a signatory country’s enforcement cost savings from deviating,
DECiðnÞ, are not monotonic in n (i.e. when 1omin voN), by Lemma 4,
DECiðnÞ is increasing for n4min v and decreasing for nXmin v þ 1. By
Proposition 3, the arguments used in the previous cases can be applied
separately to the increasing and the decreasing portion of DECiðnÞ. This
implies that there can be no more than one SPNE in the increasing portion of
DECiðnÞ, but there may be multiple SPNE in the decreasing portion.
The following proposition states that SPNE with larger numbers of
signatory countries Pareto-dominate SPNEs with a lower number of signatory
countries.
Proposition 4. Suppose that G(a,U(1)) has two SPNE, one with N0 and one with
N004N0 signatory countries. Then the SPNE with N00 Pareto-dominates the
SPNE with N0 signatory countries.
Rather than providing a formal proof of Proposition 4, in the following we
provide its intuition. First, notice that all countries that do not sign in either
SPNE are strictly better off in the second SPNE than in the first, because they
do not bear any enforcement costs and because the benefits of procurement
they enjoy are larger when a larger number of countries sign the convention.
Second, countries that sign the convention in the second equilibrium (with N00
signatory countries) but not in the first (with N0 signatory countries) receive a
higher utility in the second equilibrium than in the first. To see why this is so,
notice that if such a country were to deviate from a profile with N00 signatory
countries, it would get higher utility than in the SPNE with N0 signatory
countries, because its benefits of procurement would be higher than in that
case.12 Given that the utility in the SPNE has to be at least as large as the utility
from any deviation, the result follows. Finally, we turn to countries that sign
the convention in both SPNE. Given that additional countries with lower
idiosyncratic utilities sign the convention in the second SPNE, the enforcement
costs in the second SPNE are smaller. The fact that the benefits of procurement
are higher in the equilibrium with more signatory countries concludes the
argument.
Equilibria under the OECD Convention
We now turn to a characterization of SPNE under Conventions U(t), t41.
This analysis is useful for two reasons. First, Convention U(t), t41, gives a
stylized description of the OECD Convention (which includes a clause
requiring that a minimum number of countries, representing a minimum
percentage of OECD exports, sign it before it enters into force) and therefore
provides a framework for thinking about the OECD Convention’s likely
impact. Second, a comparison of SPNE under Convention U(1) and under
Conventions U(t), t41, makes it possible to analyse the advantages and
disadvantages of introducing a minimum threshold t41.
Notice first that the equivalents of Propositions 3 and 4 hold for G(a,U(t)).
In other words, G(a,U(t)) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple SPNE, and,
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in case of SPNE multiplicity, the SPNE with the higher number of sig-
natory countries Pareto-dominate the SPNE with a lower number of signatory
countries. The proofs are straightforward extensions of the previous results
and are, therefore, omitted.
We now want to make comparisons between SPNE under Conventions
U(1), and U(t), t41. For this purpose we find it useful to define the following
set of idiosyncratic utilities:
AðUðtÞ; nÞ ¼ a[RN : there exists a SPNE of Gða;UðtÞÞ
with at least n signatory countriesg:
Proposition 5. Consider G(a,U(1)) and G(a,U(t)) for t41.
1. A U 1ð Þ; tð Þ A U tð Þ; tð Þ and, for ton, AðUð1Þ; nÞ ¼AðUðtÞ; nÞ.
2. AðUð1Þ; 1ÞnAðUðtÞ; tÞ 6¼ ;:
Proof. See Appendix.
Parts 1 and 2 of Proposition 5 reveal that introducing a threshold t41 may
have an upside and a downside, respectively.
Part 1 states first that there exist vectors of idiosyncratic utilities such that
G(a,U(t)) has a SPNE with at least t signatory countries and G(a,U(1)) has no
such SPNE. This is true because under Convention U(t) a signatory country’s
deviation from a profile with t signatory countries leads to a reduction in the
benefits of procurement, because each of the t signatory countries is pivotal to
the Convention entering into force. Given that this loss does not occur under
Convention U(1), the incentives to deviate under Convention U(t) are fewer
than those under Convention U(1), and the result follows.13
Part 1 also states that the set of idiosyncratic utilities such that there exists a
SPNE with at least n signatory countries is the same under Convention U(1) as
under Convention U(t), if the threshold is strictly lower than n. This means that
all SPNE with n signatory countries under Convention U(1) are also SPNE
when a threshold ton is introduced. In other words, the introduction of a
threshold ton does not make a SPNE with n signatory countries more likely,
in the sense that the sets of idiosyncratic utilities which guarantee that such a
SPNE exists under the two conventions are identical.
Summarizing, part 1 says that the introduction of a threshold t is beneficial
to support a SPNE with exactly t signatory countries, but is otherwise useless.
Part 2 states that there are a such that a SPNE with a positive number of
signatory countries exists under U(1), and also that under U(t) there is no
SPNE in which the convention enters into force. This means that there are
values of a for which the introduction of a minimum threshold leads from a
convention entering into force with a possibly limited but positive number of
signatory countries to a convention that does not enter into force. Notice that
the same result can be shown to apply to the comparison of SPNE under two
different thresholds, t0 and t00, with 14t0ot004N. In other words, increasing
the threshold is always risky in that it may lead to the convention not entering
into force.
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Our interpretation of Proposition 5 is that introducing a minimum
threshold that has to be met before a convention enters into force is a sensible
requirement, which may turn out to be harmful when it is set in ignorance of
possible idiosyncratic components of individual countries’ inclinations to sign a
convention against bribery in international business transactions. In particular,
a threshold is useful when it makes every signatory country pivotal. But setting
an ambitiously high threshold may lead to a situation in which there is no
SPNE in which the convention enters into force.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE CONVENTION: THE IMPACT OF RECIPROCITY
Convention R proposes an alternative institutional design to combat
corruption in international business transactions.
Definition 4: Convention R. If a country signs the convention, the country
commits to impose the same penalty on all domestically incorporated firms
found to have bribed public officials of all other signatory countries.
Compared with the unilateral conventions analysed in the previous section,
Convention R makes use of the possibility of excluding countries from the
beneficial effects of the international fight against the bribing of foreign public
officials, unless they actively contribute to this fight. Under Convention U(t), if
country i decides not to sign, it loses idiosyncratic utility ai and it saves on
enforcement costs. When n ¼ t, moreover, a deviation also leads to the loss
deriving from the reduction in the benefits of procurement. Under Convention
R, if country i decides not to sign, there are two important novel effects. First,
if country i does not sign Convention R it saves on enforcement costs, but the
savings are smaller than under Convention U(t) if not all foreign countries sign
the convention. This derives from the fact that Convention R requires
penalizing the bribing of public officials of signatory countries only. Given that
this leads to lower enforcement costs, the savings deriving from not signing are
smaller. Second, if country i decides not to sign Convention R, it loses the
beneficial effects deriving from signatory countries’ commitment
to penalize their own firms operating in country i, because this penalty is
conditional on country i also signing the Convention. As was stated in
Corollary 1, the utility of the government of country i is increasing in the sum
of penalties imposed by foreign countries on their firms operating in country i,
@Gi=@pFi>0.
The previous discussion clarifies that Convention R provides the
governments of individual countries additional incentives to sign when they
believe that not all countries are likely to sign. This is because Convention R
creates a direct beneficial effect of signing and reduces the cost savings from
not signing when less than full participation is expected, i.e. when signing the
convention is likely to generate high costs and reduced benefits.
We now analyse the consequences on governments’ behaviour of the
incentives created by Convention R. We start by studying SPNE in G(0, R), the
game in which individual governments simultaneously decide whether or not to
sign Convention R at stage 0, and in which the idiosyncratic utilities they
receive from signing the agreement are identically zero, a ¼ 0.
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Proposition 6. In G(0, R) there is a unique SPNE in which all N countries sign
Convention R at stage 0.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows along the same lines as the proof of
Proposition 2 and is therefore omitted.
Before turning to the analysis of Convention R when individual countries
have idiosyncratic utilities, it is useful to discuss Proposition 6 and in particular
to compare it with Proposition 2. Proposition 6 states that G(0, R) has a unique
SPNE in which all countries sign Convention R. In a similar way, Proposition
2 established that G(0,U(N)) has a unique SPNE in which all countries sign
Convention U(N). This implies that the equilibrium payoffs under the two
conventions are identical. But we want to highlight that there is a sense in
which the results of the two propositions may be regarded as different, and in
particular that the disposition of countries to participate in the fight against
international corruption is more robust under Convention R than under
Convention U(N).
Notice that in both cases cooperation is achieved by making sure that
each country i receives the benefit deriving from the fact that the other
countries will prosecute their firms found to have bribed the public
official of country i only if country i itself signs the convention. Under
Convention U(N), this is achieved by making each country pivotal to the
convention entering into force. Under Convention R, it is achieved by
conditioning a country’s benefits to its participation in the convention. Notice,
however, that under Convention U(N), if for some reason it is believed
that at least one country will not sign the Convention, then all countries are
indifferent between signing or not. Under Convention R the situation is
radically different, because, so long as a country believes that at least one other
country will sign the convention, it finds it strictly profitable to sign the
convention as well.
We now turn to a characterization of SPNE under Convention R when
individual countries have idiosyncratic components in their payoff functions.
Notice first that the results of Propositions 3 and 4 extend to G(a, R). In other
words, G(a, R) always has a SPNE, it may have multiple SPNE, and in case of
SPNE multiplicity SPNE with a higher number of signatory countries
Pareto-dominate SPNE with a lower number of signatory countries. The
proofs are straightforward extensions of Propositions 3 and 4, and are there-
fore omitted.
To make comparisons between SPNE under Conventions U(t) and R, we
define the following set:
AðR; nÞ ¼ a[RN : there exists a SPNE of Gða;RÞ with at least
n signatory countriesg:
Proposition 7. Consider G(a, U(t)) and G(a, R).
1. A U tð Þ; nð Þ A R; nð Þ for t4n and toN.
2. A U Nð Þ;Nð Þ ¼A R;Nð Þ.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Part 1 of Proposition 7 states that there exist vectors of idiosyncratic
utilities such that G(a, R) has a SPNE with at least toN signatory countries
and G(a, U(t)) has no such SPNE, while the reverse is impossible. To see why
this is true, consider the case in which G(a, U(t)) admits a SPNE with exactly t
signatory countries.14 When a signatory country deviates from such a profile, it
loses its idiosyncratic payoff ai, it saves on the enforcement costs, but it will
also cause the convention not to come into force and will therefore bear an
additional loss deriving from the reduction in the benefits of procurement.
Consider the same profile under Convention R and consider a deviation of a
signatory country. The deviator loses its idiosyncratic payoff ai, it saves on the
enforcement costs and it also bears the loss deriving from the reduction in the
benefits of procurement. The first and the third elements are identical under
both Convention U(t) and Convention R. But the enforcement cost savings are
smaller when deviating under Convention R, because Convention R only
requires prosecuting the firms bribing the public officials of the other signatory
countries, which, in the case contemplated in part 1, are fewer than the total
number of countries, N. This means that the incentives to deviate from a profile
with toN signatory countries are fewer under Convention R than under
Convention U(t), and the result follows.15
Part 2 states that set of idiosyncratic utilities such that there exists a SPNE
with N signatory countries is the same under Convention U(N) as under
Convention R. The reason for this is that with t ¼ N the reduction of the
benefits of procurement to a country that deviates from a profile in which N
countries sign the convention is the same under U(t) as under R. Notice that
from Proposition 2 0[AðUðNÞ;NÞ, and from Proposition 6 0[AðR;NÞ. Part 2
generalizes this result by showing that the set of idiosyncratic utilities that lead
to a SPNE with N signatory countries is the same under U(N) and under R.
Our interpretation of the previous results is that there are two reasons why
Convention R may be preferred to Convention U(t). The first is clarified by
part 1 of Proposition 7, which suggests that a reciprocal convention is more
likely than a unilateral convention to bring countries together in the fight
against international corruption, because SPNE with any given number of
signatory countries arise with a larger set of parameter constellations in the
former than in the latter case. To see the second reason, notice that part 2 of
Proposition 7 does not say that if t is set high enough a unilateral convention
leads to the same result as a reciprocal convention. The reason is that part 2 of
Proposition 7 does not say that, when aeAðUðNÞ;NÞ ¼AðR;NÞ, the set of
SPNEs is the same under U(N) and under R. In fact, under U(N) the
convention will not enter into force in any SPNE, but it is possible that a SPNE
exists in which a positive number of countries sign Convention R.
Our discussion above clarifies that there are reasons to believe that a
unilateral convention is risky, because it may lead to no results in the fight
against international corruption, especially when the convention sets ambitious
goals through a high threshold. By contrast, a reciprocal convention creates
more incentives to participate in the fight against international corruption and
at the same time allows individual countries to gauge their ambitions through
their equilibrium play.
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VI. DISCUSSION
This paper proposes a simple theoretical framework to study the enforcement
of penalties for bribing foreign public officials. The participation of foreign
firms is commonly believed to promote competition and efficiency, but cor-
ruption in international business transactions is facilitated by the fact that it is
often very difficult or very costly to enforce penalties on foreign firms and
nationals. We analysed the ways in which international conventions may help
resolve this problem by requiring signatory countries to penalize their firms
that are found to have bribed foreign public officials.
We first studied the incentives to sign international conventions styled
along the lines of the OECD’s ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions’. In this type of con-
vention, a signatory country commits to unilaterally penalizing any of its firms
found to have bribed public officials of all foreign countries, regardless of
whether or not these countries reciprocate. We find that this type of convention
may succeed in fostering some degree of international cooperation in fighting
corruption, but it may lead to no advances when it sets goals that are too
ambitious.
We then analysed a different type of convention that includes a reciprocity
clause specifying that a signatory country commits to penalizing any of its
firms found to have bribed public officials of foreign signatory countries, i.e.
only of reciprocating countries. We show that this has two important effects:
first, it reduces the enforcement costs deriving from signing the convention
when not all countries sign it; second, it implies a loss for a country that decides
not to sign, because the advantages deriving from the fact that the foreign firms
operating in the country are subject to corruption penalties accrue only if
the country signs the convention. We showed that the ultimate consequences
of these effects are that a convention with a reciprocity provision is more
conducive to international cooperation and therefore may lead to substantial
gains in terms of reducing corruption in international business transactions.
For ease of exposition, our results are derived for the case in which the
probability of a firm succeeding in bribing a public official depends on the size
of the bribe, but is independent of the bribes bid by its competitors. Our results
do not depend on this assumption, but can be obtained for a more general
model in which the probability of any one firm succeeding in bribing the public
official depends negatively on the bribes bid by its competitors.
Our analysis is an initial step towards the understanding of international
conventions to combat corruption and it therefore relies on a simple model. We
believe that future research may lead to advances in two different directions.
First, our model is silent about various additional effects of different types
of convention. Because of its reduced risk, for instance, signing Convention R
is likely to be perceived as a politically compelling option. By this, we mean
that a government not willing to confront corruption may find it easy to argue
that a unilateral convention is likely to generate high costs and very limited
benefits, but that this argument is much less persuasive when waged against
a reciprocal convention. Moreover, because compliance with a reciprocal
convention entitles a country to enjoy its benefits, a reciprocal convention is
more likely to be accompanied by an effective surveillance system. For the
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same reason, however, it should not come as a surprise that an inspector from a
given country may have perverse motives in claiming that another country is
not complying with the convention.
Second, our model has made two important assumptions. The first is to
deal with a symmetric environment in which, other things being equal, firms
from any country have the same probability of selling in any other country.
This ignores the fact that the patterns of international trade also establish a
pattern of corruption trade and lead to a symmetric convention in which
all countries play the same role. A more realistic model would recognize
asymmetries and would likely prescribe different behaviours on the part of
corruption importers and exporters.16 The second assumption is that we have
dealt with a complete information environment, in which all countries know
their payoff functions and in particular their idiosyncratic inclinations to sign
conventions. A more realistic environment would allow for incomplete infor-
mation and for the possibility that countries’ inclinations to combat corruption
are correlated.
Future research dealing with some of the issues mentioned above is likely to
generate substantial progress in our understanding of policies designed to curb
corruption in international business transactions.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
Firm (i, j)’s maximization problem is
max
bij
gij K K
 
bij mjpij
  ¼ bij
B
K K
 
bij mjpij
 
:
The first order condition is
1
B
K K
 
2bij mjpij
  ¼ 0:
Given that the second order condition is satisfied (because 2/Bo0), the lemma
follows. &
Proof of Lemma 2
From Lemma 1, the probability of corruption in country i is
gi ¼
1
2B
N K K
 
mi
XN
j 1
pji
" #
:
Given this, the problem for the government of country i in stage 2 is
max
mi
1 gið Þ V K
 þ gi V K  M2 m2i XN
j 1
gijmj
pij
p
P:
From (7) and (8), this problem is equivalent to
max
mi
1
2B
mi
XN
j 1
pji V V
  pii
p
P K K
  !þ 1
2B
pii
p
Ppii MB
 
m2i
" #
:
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The first order condition for an interior solution is
ðA1Þ 1
2B
XN
j 1
pji V V
  pii
p
P K K
  !þ 1
B
pii
p
Ppii MB
 
mi ¼ 0
Assuming that the second order condition is satisfied,
pii
p
Ppii MB<0;
we obtain
mi ¼
V V
 PN
j 1 pji
pii
p
P K K
 
2 MB
pii
p
Ppii
  :
Notice that if
PN
j 1 pji*p, (5) implies that mi40. &
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that by Lemma 2
PN
j 1 pji*p for j ¼ 1, . . . ,N implies that mj40, j ¼ 1, . . . ,N.
Simple inspection of the objective function of the government of country i ¼ 1, . . . ,N,
implies that, in a SPNE, pij ¼ 0 for i ¼ 1, . . . ,N and j 6¼ i. We now want to show that (5)
is sufficient to guarantee that, in a SPNE, pii ¼ p for j ¼ 1, . . . ,N. To see this, consider
p00 and p0 that differ only in that
p0ii ¼ 0
p00ii ¼ p
We now compare government i’s utility from setting pii ¼ p or pii ¼ 0 for an arbitrary
value of mi and for gi and gij given by (8) and (9):
Gi m; p00; gð Þ Gi m; p0; gð Þ ¼ V V
2B
mip
1
2B
mi K K
 
mip
 
P
>
m2i pP
2B
>0;
with the first inequality following from (5). Notice that this inequality implies that
max
mi [ 0; 1½ 
Gi m; p00; gð Þ max
mi [ 0; 1½ 
Gi m; p0; gð Þ>0
if
argmax
mi [ ½0; 1
Giðm; p00; gÞ>0;
a condition that is satisfied by Lemma 2. This in turn means that under (5), in a SPNE
of G, the government of each country i will penalize the domestic firm that operates in
the country. Summarizing, we get
pnij ¼
p if j ¼ i
0 if j 6¼ i :

The rest of the results stated in Proposition 1 follow from straightforward substitutions. &
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Proof of Corollary 1
Differentiating (10) with respect to pFi we obtain
@mi
@pFi
¼ V V
2 MB
pii
p
Ppii
 >0;
with the inequality following from the fact that the second order condition for the
government’s problem ensures that the denominator is positive.
Rewrite corruption in country i as
gi ¼
1
2B
N K K
 
pFi miðpþ pFiÞ
 
:
Differentiating with respect to pFi, we obtain
@gi
@pFi
¼ @mi
@pFi
ðpþ pFiÞ mi<0:
Consider now government i’s best response to a given pFi. To show that
@Gi=@pFi>0, it is sufficient to observe that when pFi is increased government i’s utility
is higher even if its play is unchanged. &
Proof of Proposition 2
Since we assume that, whenever indifferent between signing or not, a country signs the
convention, it is immediate to recognize that there is a unique SPNE with either N 1
or N countries signing the agreement. In the following we show that the unique SPNE is
for all countries to sign the agreement.
Consider an arbitrary government i and assume that all the other N 1 countries
sign the convention. We want to show that government i’s best response is to sign the
convention.
The utility of the government of country i, if it signs the convention, is
GSi ¼ X þ V K
 
Nmi
M
2
m2i
XN
j 1
gijmjP;
where
X ¼ V K þN V V  K K 
2B
:
The utility of the government of country i when it does not sign the convention is
GNSi ¼X þ V K
 
mi
M
2
m2i giimiP
¼X þ V K mi M2 m2i P2B K K  mip mi:
We want to show that GSi >G
NS
i .
Let mSn denote the SPNE monitoring probability in a signatory country in a
subgame starting after N countries sign the convention. Let mNSn denote the SPNE
monitoring probability in a non signatory country in a subgame starting after N 1
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countries sign the convention. We then have
GSi ¼ X þ V K
 
NmSn
M
2
ðmSnÞ2 N P
2B
K K
 
mSnp
 
mSn
¼ X þN½ V K mSn M
2N
ðmSnÞ2 P
2B
K K
 
mSnp
 
mSn
*X þN½ V K mNSn M
2N
ðmNSnÞ2 P
2B
K K
 
mNSnp
 
mNSn
>X þN½ V K mNSn M
2
ðmNSnÞ2 P
2B
K K
 
mNSnp
 
mNSn
>X þ V K mNSn M
2
ðmNSnÞ2 P
2B
K K
 
mNSnp
 
mNSn ¼ GNSi ;
with the first inequality following from the fact that mSn is the optimal monitoring
probability for a signatory country and the last inequality deriving from the fact that
mNSn40 implies
V K
 
mNSn
M
2
mNSn
 2 P
2B
K K
 
mNSnp
 
mNSn>0: &
Proof of Lemma 4
Recall from Lemma 3 that
DECi nð Þ ¼ n 1ð ÞgSnimSn þ N nð ÞgNSni mNSn
 
P;
where
gSni ¼
1
2B
K K
 
mSnp
 
gNSni ¼
1
2B
K K
 
mNSnp
 
mSn ¼ n 1ð Þ V V
 
p K K
 
P
2 BM pPð Þ
mNSn ¼ n V V
 
p K K
 
P
2 BM pPð Þ :
Letting
F ¼K K
2B
G ¼ V V
 
p
2 BM pPð Þ
H ¼ K K
 
P
2 BM pPð Þ ;
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we obtain
DECiðnÞ¼ n 1ð Þ F mSn p
2B
	 

mSnþ N nð Þ F mSnþG  p
2B
	 

mSnþG  P
¼ ðN 1Þ F mSn p
2B
	 

mSnþðN nÞ G F ðmSnþGÞ p
2B
	 
	
GmSn
p
2B


P
¼ ðN 1Þ F ðGðn 1Þ HÞ p
2B
	 

ðG n 1ð Þ HÞ

þðN nÞ G F ðGn HÞ p
2B
	 

GðGðn 1Þ HÞ p
2B
	 

P:
Letting
Q0¼ N 1ð Þ GþHð Þ Fþ GþHð Þ p
2B
	 

þNGFþ2NGH p
2B
þNG2 p
2B
Q1¼ N 1ð Þ Fþ2 GþHð Þ p
2B
	 

G 2NG2
p
2B
GF 2GH
p
2B
G2
p
2B
Q2¼ N 1ð ÞG2 p
2B
þ2G2 p
2B
¼ð3 NÞG2 p
2B
;
we get
DECi nð Þ¼ Q0þQ1nþQ2n2
 
P:
Note that, if NX 3, Q240 and DECi nð Þ is concave in n. &
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider G(a,U(1)). Recall that we assume that a1X . . . X aN and that, whenever
indifferent between signing or not, a country signs the convention. Given this, a profile
in which N0 countries sign the convention may be part of a SPNE if and only if
aN 0*DECi N 0ð Þ
aN 0þ1< DECi N 0 þ 1ð Þ:
We first want to establish the existence of SPNE. If a1<DEC1 1ð Þ, there exists a
SPNE in which no country signs the convention. When a1*DEC1 1ð Þ, there are two
cases:
1. There exists a country j such that
ai*DECi j 1ð Þ for all i< j
aj<DECj jð Þ:
In this case there exists a SPNE in which only countries i ¼ 1, . . . , j 1 sign the
convention.
2. There exists no country j such that aj<DECj jð Þ. In this case aN*DECN Nð Þ, and
there exists a SPNE in which all countries sign the convention.
We now want to show that G(a,U(1)) admits at most one SPNE with min v or fewer
signatory countries, but multiple SPNE with min v þ 1 or more signatory countries. By
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definition of v, DECiðnÞ is increasing for all n4min v and decreasing for all nXmin
v þ 1.
Consider first n4min v and assume that there is a SPNE in which N04min v
countries sign the convention. This implies that
aN 0*DECN 0 ðN 0Þ
aN 0þ1<DECN 0þ1ðN 0 þ 1Þ:
But then it is impossible to have another SPNE with N00A{N0 þ 1, . . . , min v} signatory
countries, because
aN 00*DECN 00 N 00ð Þ
cannot be satisfied for N00A{N0 þ 1, . . . , min v}, given that
aN 0þ1*aN 00
and
DECi N
00ð Þ>DECi N 0ð Þ
N00A{N0 þ 1, . . . , min v}.
Consider now nXmin v þ 1. Assume that there is a SPNE in which only N0Xmin
v þ 1 countries sign the convention. This implies that
ðA2Þ aN 0*DECN 0 N 0ð Þ
ðA3Þ aN 0þ1<DECN 0þ1 N 0 þ 1ð Þ:
Given that DECi nð Þ is decreasing for nXmin v þ 1, there exists an a[RN such that
ðA4Þ aN 0þk*DECN 0þk N 0 þ kð Þ
ðA5Þ aN 0þkþ1<DECN 0þkþ1 N 0 þ kþ 1ð Þ
for kX 2. This means that there exists an a[RN such that G(a,U(1)) has two SPNE, with
N0Xmin v þ 1 and N00 ¼ N0 þ k signatory countries, respectively. Notice that the
condition kX 2 is necessary, because for k ¼ 1 (14) would contradict (13). &
Proof of Proposition 5
Part 1. Consider a SPNE with n4t signatory countries. Given that deviation payoffs
for both signatory and non signatory countries are identical under U(1) and U(t), we get
A U 1ð Þ; nð Þ ¼ A U tð Þ; nð Þ.
Consider now an a such that a SPNE with t signatory countries under U(1) exists.
This implies that the deviation payoffs for all signatory countries are non positive. For
signatory countries, i ¼ 1, . . . , t, we therefore have
ðA6Þ DECi tð Þ ai)0:
Recalling that we assume that, if indifferent a country signs the convention, for non
signatory countries i ¼ t, þ 1, . . . ,N we have
ai DECi tþ 1ð Þ<0
Notice that under U(t) the only difference that arises is that a deviation for a signatory
country also brings about a reduction in the benefits of procurement. This implies that
(16) is a sufficient condition for the deviation payoffs to signatory countries to be
negative under U(t) and therefore that a[A U 1ð Þ; tð Þ implies that a[A U tð Þ; tð Þ.
We now want to show that there exists a that belong to A U tð Þ; tð Þ but not to
A U 1ð Þ; tð Þ. Let an [RN be such that country t is exactly indifferent between deviating or
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not deviating from a profile in which t countries sign Convention U(1),
ant DECi tð Þ ¼ 0;
and such that the rest of the signatory countries strictly prefer to sign and non signatory
countries not to sign. Consider now ann[RN such that
anni ¼ani e for i ¼ 1; . . . ; t
anni ¼ani d for i ¼ tþ 1; . . . ;N:
Consider d40 such that, for all eA(0, d), anneA U 1ð Þ; tð Þ. Given that a signatory
country’s deviation under U(t) also leads to a reduction in the benefits of procurement,
a signatory country’s deviation payoff is lower, and this implies that there exist eA(0, d)
such that ann[A U tð Þ; tð Þ.
Part 2. Consider an a such that at  1is sufficiently large and at is sufficiently small.
Then, a[A U 1ð Þ; 1ð Þ but aeA U tð Þ; tð Þ, for all t41.17 &
Proof of Proposition 7
Part 1. Consider a profile with t signatory countries and suppose it may be part of a
SPNE of U(t). This implies that, for every signatory country i ¼ 1, . . . , t, DECi tð Þ ai
has to be at least as large as the reduction of the benefits of procurement that takes place
because a country’s unilateral deviation is sufficient for the convention not to come into
force. Consider now the same profile under Convention R. If a signatory country
deviates from such a profile, it will also lose ai and will suffer a reduction in the benefits
of procurement, so that the deviation payoff is the same as with U(t). But because, when
toN, the enforcement costs under R are smaller than under U(t), the equilibrium
payoff under R is larger. This means that, if a signatory countries does not find it
profitable to deviate from a profile with t signatory countries under U(t), it will also find
it profitable not to deviate under R. This implies that under R there exists a SPNE with
either t or strictly more than t signatory countries.
In the case of n4t signatory countries, the argument is reinforced by the fact that
under U(t) a unilateral deviation leaves the benefits of procurement to the deviator
unaffected, whereas under R a deviation for a signatory country leads to a reduction in
the benefits of procurement and a deviation for a non signatory country leads to a gain
in the benefits of procurement.
This shows that, for toN and nX t, a[A U tð Þ; nð Þ implies that a[A R; nð Þ.
We now want to show that, for toN and nX t, there exists an a[RN such that
aeA U tð Þ; nð Þ and a[A R; nð Þ.
Let an[RN be such that country t is exactly indifferent between deviating or not
deviating from a profile in which t countries sign Convention U(t) and such that the rest
of the signatory countries strictly prefer to sign and non signatory countries prefer not
to sign.
Consider now ann[RN such that
anni ¼ ani e for i ¼ 1; . . . ; t
anni ¼ ani d for i ¼ tþ 1; . . . ;N:
Consider d40 such that, for all eA(0, d), anneA U tð Þ; tð Þ. Given that a signatory
country’s enforcement costs under R are lower, than under U(t), a signatory country’s
deviation payoff is lower, and this implies that there exist eA(0, d) such that ann[A R; tð Þ.
In the case of n4t signatory countries, the argument is reinforced by the fact that under
U(t) a unilateral deviation leaves the benefits of procurement to the deviator unaffected,
whereas under R a deviation for a signatory country leads to a reduction in the benefits
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of procurement, and a deviation for a non signatory country leads to a gain in the
benefits of procurement.
Part 2. Consider a profile in which all N countries sign either Convention U(N)
or Convention R. Notice that the payoffs associated with this profile in G(a, U(N))
and G(a,R) are identical and so are the deviation payoffs. This implies that
A U Nð Þ;Nð Þ ¼A R;Nð Þ. &
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NOTES
1. Information about the OECD Convention may be obtained from http://www.oecd.org.
2. Eigen (2002, p. 6). Peter Eigen is chairman of Transaparency International, an NGO
dedicated to the fight against corruption.
3. Burns (2002, p. 12). Similar opinions are also found in The Economist (2002).
4. To retain symmetry, we want to focus on a situation in which each country has a firm that is
active in each other country. An alternative, equivalent, formulation is one in which each
country has only one (multinational) firm that operates in all countries.
5. B may include factors such as the penalty for the public official or his opportunity cost for
losing his job. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that B is the same for all countries, but
our results can be generalized to the case in which the public officials of different countries
have different propensities to be corrupt.
6. Taking these costs into account would recognize an additional source of externality. When a
country prosecutes its firms abroad, it reduces the probability that they will be involved in
corrupt transactions and therefore benefits foreign countries by reducing their expected
prosecution costs.
7. As mentioned above, the literature on rent seeking also views the allocation of rents as
deriving from contest success functions that have desirable properties such as that the
probability of a rent seeker being assigned the rent is higher when he expends more
resources in the contest.
8. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the importance of justifying this
assumption.
9. Appendix B in Celentani et al. (2003) analyses the bribing game in which the probability of
succeeding in bribing the public official is as in (6).
10. This assumption has been made by, among others, Laffont and Tirole (1991) who provide
several examples of favouritism towards domestic firms in international trade.
11. For an analysis of bribing and procurement in asymmetric information settings, see Laffont
and Tirole (1991) and Celentani and Ganuza (2002).
12. This is true so long as N004N0 þ 1, a condition that is easily shown to hold.
13. Notice that part 1 also claims that if a[AðUð1Þ; tÞ then a[AðUðtÞ; tÞ. This result is also
an immediate consequence of the fact that the incentive to deviate from a profile with t
signatory countries is larger under U(1) than under U(t).
14. The analysis of the case in which a SPNE exists with strictly more than t signatory countries
proceeds along very similar lines and is therefore not discussed in the text.
15. Notice that Part 1 also claims that, if a[AðUðtÞ; tÞ, then a[AðR; tÞ. This result is also a
consequence of the fact that the incentive to deviate from a profile with t signatory
countries is greater under U(t) than under R. Notice also that the arguments above do not
rule out that, for a given a, Convention R provides enough incentives for additional
countries to sign, and therefore that a SPNE with strictly more than t signatory countries
exists.
16. On this issue see Davis (2002), which analyses the incentives to join an anti bribery
convention of payor countries (countries where bribing companies are incorporated) and
payee countries (countries where bribed public officials reside).
17. In fact, notice that a[AðUðt 1Þ; t 1Þ but aeAðUðtÞ; tÞ:
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